The Supreme Court of India recently remarked that the original Public Interest Litigation (PIL) concerning the entry of women into the Sabarimala Ayyappan temple in Kerala "ought to have been dismissed," signaling a significant judicial observation on the genesis of the long-running legal dispute. This statement emerged during ongoing deliberations related to the broader constitutional questions stemming from the Sabarimala case, which are currently before a larger bench of the apex court.

The observation comes amidst complex legal proceedings and review petitions against the Supreme Court's own landmark 2018 judgment. That verdict had lifted the traditional ban on women of menstruating age (10-50 years) from entering the Sabarimala temple, citing gender equality and non-discrimination. The 2018 ruling had sparked widespread protests and numerous review petitions, leading the Supreme Court to refer the matter and several other issues related to religious freedom and practices to a larger bench of seven judges in November 2019.

The original PIL, titled Indian Young Lawyers Association vs The State of Kerala, was filed in 2006. It specifically challenged Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted the exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 years from the temple. The petitioners argued that this rule violated fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution, including the right to equality (Article 14), non-discrimination (Article 15), and freedom of religion (Article 25).

The recent comment from the Supreme Court, though not a formal ruling on the original PIL itself, carries weight as it reflects a judicial perspective on the appropriateness of the initial litigation and the extent of judicial intervention in matters of religious custom. This observation could potentially influence ongoing arguments before the larger bench, which is tasked with examining fundamental questions such as:

  • The relationship between Articles 25 (freedom of religion) and 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs) of the Constitution.
  • The definition of "morality" as used in Articles 25 and 26.
  • The concept of "religious denomination" and its application to practices like the Sabarimala tradition.
  • The extent to which courts can inquire into the essential practices of a religion.

While the Supreme Court's remark does not immediately alter the legal status quo or the existing referral to the larger bench, it adds a nuanced dimension to the ongoing judicial discourse. It underscores a potential re-evaluation of the parameters for entertaining public interest litigations challenging long-standing religious practices and traditions. The seven-judge bench continues its deliberations on these complex constitutional questions, with its final judgment anticipated to have far-reaching implications for religious freedom and the interpretation of fundamental rights across India.